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NOTES
Under this provision of the proposed code a plaintiff is not
restricted to the relief specifically prayed for; in this manner
the same result would be achieved without imposing an unneces-
sary delay on the judicial recognition of plaintiff's substantive
rights.
Ray Carlton Muirhead
TAXATION - ACCOUNTING FOR PREPAID INCOME
The Automobile Club of Michigan furnishes road and map
services to its members in accordance with one-year membership
contracts, the dues for which are paid in advance. When re-
ceived, the dues are credited to a liability account entitled "Un-
earned Membership Dues," and monthly thereafter one-twelfth
of this amount is transferred to an income account designated
"Membership Income." The Commissioner rejected the taxpay-
er's method of accounting and held that all membership dues are
taxable in the year received.' The Tax Court sustained the Com-
missioner on the grounds that the dues must be reported in the
year received in order to reflect income clearly. 2 On appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, held, affirmed be-
cause money received under a "claim of right" is taxable income
in the year received.3 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. The taxpayer's method of accounting failed to reflect
income clearly. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner,
1 L. Ed. 746 (U.S. 1957).
It is within the intendment of the income tax laws that each
taxpayer should compute his tax liability in accordance with the
method of accounting which he regularly employs. 4 Section 42
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 expressly states that in
not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for
general and equitable relief. A judgment by default shall not grant greater relief
than that prayed for in the petition."
1. Acting in 1945 the Commissioner revoked his 1934 and 1938 rulings which:
had exempted the taxpayer from federal income taxes and applied the revoca-
tion retroactively to the years 1943 and 1944.
2. Automobile Club of Michigan, 20 T.C. 1033, 1047 (1953) : "Since the entire
amount of membership dues was income for the year in which received and since
the petitioner's method of accounting for income did not take cognizance of the
full amount thereof in such year, it is apparent that the petitioner's method of
accounting did not clearly reflect its income."
3. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 585 (6th Cir.
1956).
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 41; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.41-43: "It is recog-
nized that no uniform method of accounting can be prescribed for all taxpayers,
and the law contemplates that each taxpayer shall adopt such forms and systems
of accounting as are in his judgment best suited to his purposes."
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accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed
gross income may be reported in a year other than the year of
receipt, provided there is a clear reflection of income. 5 This
language has been thought to refer to a clear reflection of in-
come in accordance with accepted accounting practices, and
therefore to mean earned income. 6 Generally, earned income is
income received less the cost incurred as an incident of such
receipt.
The Tax Court and some circuits of the court of appeals have
adopted the "claim of right" rule to determine the year in which
prepaid income is taxable.7 Under this rule all income received
by the taxpayer for his free and unrestricted use, including the
present right to receive payment," is considered as taxable in-
come in the year that it is received, regardless of what future
obligations the taxpayer incurs by receiving the money or in
what year these obligations will be performed.9 This rule was
first enunciated in North American Oil Co. Consolidated v.
Burnet.10 In that case the Supreme Court held that income re-
ceived by the taxpayer under a "claim of right" and without any
restriction as to its use is taxable in the year that the income is
received, although there is litigation in progress contesting the
taxpayer's right to the money.
The instant case marks the first time that the Supreme Court
has rendered a decision determining the year in which prepaid
5. This section is now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 451: "The amount of any
item of gross income shall be included in the gross income for the taxable year
in which received by the taxpayer, unless, under the method of accounting used
in computing taxable income, such amount is to be properly accounted for as of
a different period."
6. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1954) : "Present law provides that the net income of a tax-
payer shall be computed in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed by the taxpayer, if such method clearly reflects the income. Neverthe-
less, as a result of court decisions and rulings, there have developed many diver-
gencies between the computation of income for tax purposes and income for busi-
ness purposes as computed under generally accepted accounting principles. The
areas of difference are confined almost entirely to questions of when certain types
of revenue and expenses should be taken into account in arriving at net income."
7. Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1943);
South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943) ; Renwick
v. United States, 87 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Wallace A. Moritz, 21 T.C. 622
(1954) ; Your Health Club, Inc., 4 T.C. 385 (1944) ; South Tacoma Motor Co., 3
T.C. 411 (1944). See also Pioneer Automobile Service Co., 36 B.T.A. 213 (1937) ;
Automobile Underwriters Inc., 19 B.T.A. 1160 (1930). But see Beacon Publishing
Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955), where the court expressly
rejected the rule because its application presented a distorted taxable income figure.
8. Your Health Club, Inc., 4 T.C. 385 (1944).
9. See cases cited note 7 aupra.
10. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
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income is taxable. The majority opinion failed to pass upon the
propriety of using the "claim of right" rule to determine the year
in which prepaid income is taxable. In view of the disagreement
among :the several circuits of the courts of appeals concerning
this matter, a definitive opinion would have been desirable."
Justice Harlan in his dissent pointed out that the Supreme Court
instituted the rule in North American Oil Co. Consolidated v.
Burnet12 as a test to determine what income is taxable, not in
what year it is taxable; therefore, any application of the rule
for the latter purpose is a misapplication.
Having passed the question of the "claim of right" rule
almost without comment, the majority seemed to concede
arguendo that income may be reported in a year other than the
one in which it is received, provided there is a clear reflection of
income. But the Court found that "the pro rata allocation of the
membership dues is purely artificial and bears no relation to the
services which the petitioner may in fact be called upon to render
for the membership." Consequently, there was no clear reflec-
tion of income which would warrant holding that the Commis-
sioner had abused his discretion by requiring the income to be
reported as taxable in the year it was received. While it is true
that the taxpayer could not know what would be the actual cost
of the services which it might be called upon to render, it is also
true that it did know exactly how much it was being paid each
month to render the services. The taxpayer was not attempting
to estimate the cost of fulfilling its contractual obligations; it
was attempting to defer its unearned income to the month in
which it would be earned. This practice is clearly approved in
Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and is separate
and distinct from the practice of deducting estimated expenses
which is provided for in Section 43.13 The difference in the two
practices is that the taxpayer who is deferring prepaid income is
postponing the income to the year or month in which he will
11. See Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Pacific
Grape Products Co. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Beacon Pub-
lishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955) ; Patsch v. Commis-
sioner, 208 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Fourth Avenue Amusement Co. v. Glen, 201
F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir.
1951) ; Capital Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 171 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1948)
Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1944)
South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943) ; Vang v.
Lewellyn, 35 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1929).
12. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 43; for a more complete discussion of the tax
law pertaining to prepaid income and estimated expenses, see Comment, 17 Louisi-
AHlA LAW REviEw 628 (1957).
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"earn" it. The taxpayer who is deducting estimated expenses is
accelerating the estimated cost of fulfilling his contractual obli-
gations to the year or month in which he receives payment under
a particular contract. Viewed in this light, it would appear that
the method of bookkeeping employed by the taxpayer clearly re-
flected its income within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, and that the Court's disapproval of the method
employed is attributable to a failure to distinguish between the
closely related, but absolutely different problems of accounting
for accrued estimated and for prepaid income.
In the present case the Court directed the greater part of its
efforts to an exposition of the law on the question of the Com-
missioner's retroactive application of his new ruling that the
petitioner is not a tax exempt club under Section 101(9).14 The
decision as it relates to prepaid income seems to have been de-
cided incidentally to that question. Since no thorough examina-
tion of the law as it concerns prepaid income was made in the
case, the question of what year prepaid income is taxable will
remain unsettled until the Supreme Court considers the matter
more thoroughly in a later decision.
W. Bernard Kramer
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 101(9).
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